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We study the convergence rate of a continuous-time simulated annealing process \begin{document}$ (X_t; \, t \ge 0) $\end{document} for approximating the global optimum of a given function \begin{document}$ f $\end{document}. We prove that the tail probability \begin{document}$ \mathbb{P}(f(X_t) > \min f +\delta) $\end{document} decays polynomial in time with an appropriately chosen cooling schedule of temperature, and provide an explicit convergence rate through a non-asymptotic bound. Our argument applies recent development of the Eyring-Kramers law on functional inequalities for the Gibbs measure at low temperatures.

 

We revisit Markowitz’s mean-variance portfolio selection model by considering a distributionally robust version, in which the region of distributional uncertainty is around the empirical measure and the discrepancy between probability measures is dictated by the Wasserstein distance. We reduce this problem into an empirical variance minimization problem with an additional regularization term. Moreover, we extend the recently developed inference methodology to our setting in order to select the size of the distributional uncertainty as well as the associated robust target return rate in a data-driven way. Finally, we report extensive back-testing results on S&P 500 that compare the performance of our model with those of several well-known models including the Fama–French and Black–Litterman models. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, finance. 

We consider the problem of stopping a diffusion process with a payoff functional that renders the problem time‐inconsistent. We study stopping decisions of naïve agents who reoptimize continuously in time, as well as equilibrium strategies of sophisticated agents who anticipate but lack control over their future selves' behaviors. When the state process is one dimensional and the payoff functional satisfies some regularity conditions, we prove that any equilibrium can be obtained as a fixed point of an operator. This operator represents strategic reasoning that takes the future selves' behaviors into account. We then apply the general results to the case when the agents distort probability and the diffusion process is a geometric Brownian motion. The problem is inherently time‐inconsistent as the level of distortion of a same event changes over time. We show how the strategic reasoning may turn a naïve agent into a sophisticated one. Moreover, we derive stopping strategies of the two types of agent for various parameter specifications of the problem, illustrating rich behaviors beyond the extreme ones such as “never‐stopping” or “never‐starting.”